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judicially interpreted in commercial general liability (CGL) policies. 
This Article looks at the history of the absolute pollution exclusion (the 
Exclusion), discusses leading cases under New York and Canadian 
law—which has relied on New York law—and considers general 
approaches that courts have used to interpret the Exclusion. Today, the 
Exclusion has evolved into a provision that excludes coverage for a 
broad range of pollution-related liability. Precisely how the Exclusion 
applies in different circumstances remains the subject of debate some 
thirty years after it became a part of the CGL policy form, even though 
its language is clear. To some extent, both New York and Canadian 
courts have artificially limited the Exclusion to “environmental” or 
“outdoor” pollution, even though those words do not appear in its text. 
In addition, courts have restricted policyholder efforts to expand 
coverage beyond contractual terms and have enforced the Exclusion 
even when the policyholder is blameless in causing the pollution—even 
for what may be considered nontraditional and nonenvironmental types 
of pollution. This approach gives effect to the longstanding, venerable 
principle in Anglo-American law that contracts should be read as 
written. Policyholders, insurers, and practitioners would be wise to 
consider these developments.  
I 
THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION WAS BORN IN 1986 
In 1971, New York enacted a statute that required insurance carriers 
to include a limited pollution exclusion in all CGL policies issued in 
the State.1 This limited pollution exclusion denied insurance coverage 
for damages from pollution but did not apply to “sudden and 
accidental” pollution.2 The Insurance Services Office (the ISO), then 
known as the Insurance Rating Board, included a limited pollution 
exclusion as part of the basic CGL policy form in 1973.3 The relevant 
provision was as follows: 
The insurance does not apply to: 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, 
1 This statute was repealed in 1982. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 46(13)–(14) (recodified as N.Y. 
Ins. Law § 1113 (McKinney 2017) by 1984 Laws ch. 367, § 2). 
2 Id. 
3 The limited pollution exclusion was first introduced as an endorsement in 1970 before 
being incorporated into the ISO policy form in 1973. In 1986, the absolute pollution 
exclusion replaced the limited pollution exclusion. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1113 (McKinney 2017). 
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alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere 
or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not 
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and 
accidental.4 
Following much litigation about the meaning of “sudden and 
accidental,” New York’s highest court interpreted “sudden” to exclude 
long-term and continuous pollution and “accidental” to exclude 
intentional discharge with unexpected consequences.5 A similar history 
can be traced in Canada, which adopted the same exclusion in the 
standard CGL policy form.6 
In 1986, the ISO removed the “sudden and accidental” exception to 
the pollution exclusion from its CGL policy form and applied the 
pollution exclusion to an expanded definition of “pollutants,” which 
included “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, 
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste.”7 This revised language is referred to as the “absolute” pollution 
exclusion.8 The Insurance Bureau of Canada added the Exclusion to 
Canadian CGL policies in 1985, and the Exclusion is now largely 
standard—with some variations—in CGL policies issued in both the 
United States and Canada.9 
4 Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, ISO 1973 Coverage Part Specimen, 
Section 1, Exclusion (f); Appendix B. 1973 Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) 
Insurance Policy, 3 ENVTL. INS. LITIG.: L. & PRAC. Appendix B (2018) (GL0002 Ed. 01-
73) (quoting 1973 ISO CGL Form); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772,
113 S. Ct. 2891, 2896–97, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993) (referring to ISO standard CGL 
insurance form “that had been in use since 1973 (1973 ISO CGL form)”); ENVTL. INS. 
LITIG.: L. & PRAC. § 7:1 (2018), Westlaw (quoting 1973 ISO CGL Form). 
5 See, e.g., Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048, 
1050–51 (1989) (holding that “accidental” provides an exception to the pollution exclusion 
only for unintentional pollution and “sudden” imposes a temporal requirement in order to 
prevent superfluity with “accidental”). 
6 Zurich Ins. Co. v. 686234 Ont. Ltd., 62 O.R. 3d 447, 453–54 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2002). 
7 Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, ISO Form CG 00 01 12 07, Section 
V(15). 
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Construing the “Absolute” 
Pollution Exclusion in Context and in Light of Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 
TORTS & INS. L.J. 1, 2 (1998). 
9 Zurich, 62 O.R. 3d at 453–54. 
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II 
SOME CASES HAVE TRIED TO LIMIT THE EXCLUSION 
A. New York 
Some New York cases have interpreted the Exclusion to apply only 
to environmental pollution, even though nothing in the Exclusion’s text 
expressly so limits it. These cases suggest that the terms “discharge, 
dispersal, release and escape” in the Exclusion are environmental terms 
of art meant to exclude only industrial pollution, even though nothing 
about these common English words actually suggests that.10 There is 
nothing on the face of the Exclusion that exempts it from applying to 
nonenvironmental pollution such as poisonous gasses,11 biological 
organisms,12 or lead paint, as some courts around the country have 
held.13 Commentators have noted that the deciding factor in New York 
appears to be where the pollutant is located, rather than what it is. But 
10 See, e.g., Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 
F.3d 33, 44 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing the Ninth Circuit to explain that “contamination” should 
be interpreted as an environmental term of art); Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 795 
N.E.2d 15, 17 (2003) (confirming that an insurance policy is interpreted in light of common 
speech and the reasonable expectations of a businessperson). 
11 See, e.g., Assicurazioni Gen. S.P.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1005–06 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(carbon monoxide); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 901 (3d Cir. 1997) (carbon 
monoxide); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473, 475–76 (5th Cir. 1996) (paint and 
glue fumes); IKO Monroe, Inc. v. Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Canada, Inc., No. 00-834, 
2001 WL 1568674, at 4–5 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 2001) (“noxious odors”); Toledo v. Van Waters 
& Rogers, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 44, 51–52 (D.R.I. 2000) (toxic fumes); Bimminous Cas. 
Corp. v. R.J. Taylor Corp., 1998 WL 1992911, at 2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 8, 1998) (sewer 
gas and carbon dioxide buildup); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 
112, 120–22 (Neb. 2001) (toxic fumes); Leo Haus, Inc. v. Selective Ins., 801 A.2d 419, 423 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (carbon monoxide); Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleyville 
Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 108 (Pa. 1999) (sealant fumes); Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn 
Nat’l Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1109, 1113–14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (carbon monoxide); Zaiontz 
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 565, 573–74 (Tex. App. 2002) (“fire and odor
eliminator”). 
12 See, e.g., Sharp v. Vick, No. 02-1575, 2003 WL 21544114, ¶ 20 (Wis. Ct. App. July 
10, 2003); see also Royal Ins. Co. v. Bithell, 868 F. Supp. 878, 880–81 (E.D. Mich. 1993) 
(“[I]n this Court’s view, raw sewage is clearly a contaminant.”); Matcon Diamond, 815 A.2d 
at 1113 (citing Municipality of Mt. Lebanon v. Reliance Ins. Co., 778 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2001)); Blackhawk-Cent. City Sanitation Dist. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 
214 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Warren, 176 F. Supp. 2d 
728, 732 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
13 See, e.g., Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So.2d 789 15 (Ala. 2002); Lititz 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 785 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa. 2001); Mistick, Inc. v. N.W. Nat’l Cas. Co., 
806 A.2d 39, 43–44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Peace ex rel. Lerner v. N.W. Nat’l Ins. Co., 596 
N.W.2d 429, 437–38 (Wis. 1999). 
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the Exclusion by its terms does not consider the pollutant’s location.14 
Thus, at least one New York court has ruled that indoor pollution that 
does not implicate pollutants discharged outdoors does not, absent 
other factors, fit in the Exception.15 
In Roofers’ Joint Training, Apprentice & Educational Committee of 
Western New York v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, a 
New York appellate court held that the Exclusion did not preclude 
coverage for toxic fumes that were released during a construction 
safety course conducted by the policyholder.16 In Roofers, the court 
found that the specific exclusion was ambiguous, and the court then 
looked to what it believed was the exclusion’s general purpose. The 
court found that purpose to be something other than the Exclusion’s 
plain language indicated: excluding coverage for environmental 
pollution.17 Because the injured parties were in the immediate vicinity 
when they inhaled the toxic fumes, the court concluded that there was 
no “discharge, dispersal . . . release or escape of pollutants.”18 The 
panel observed that without some limiting principle, “pollutants” could 
include virtually all chemicals and the pollution exclusion would 
completely preclude coverage.19 Thus, the court concluded that the 
pollution exclusion should be limited to what it described as 
“environmental” pollution.20 Of course, the policyholder is free to 
purchase the precise coverage it needs without having a court expand 
the scope of coverage after the fact by limiting the Exclusion to 
“environmental” pollution—which is a term not found in the 
exclusion’s text. 
The New York Court of Appeals adopted this view about what it 
described as “environmental” pollution in Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG 
Insurance Co., where the policyholder pursued coverage for injuries 
that arose from underlying claimants inhaling paint and solvent fumes 
14 See William P. Shelley & Joshua A. Mooney, Toxic Torts and the Absolute Pollution 
Exclusion Revisited, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 55 (2003) (discussing how cases 
have focused on the location of the pollution rather than how it fits within the exclusion’s 
wording). 
15 See, e.g., Belt Painting Corp., 795 N.E.2d at 20. 
16 Roofers’ Joint Training, Apprentice & Educ. Comm. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am., 275 A.D.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
17 Id. at 92. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 92–93. 
20 Id. at 93. 
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during stripping and painting work in an office building.21 The court 
affirmed an intermediate appellate decision holding that the pollution 
exclusion applies “only where the damages alleged are truly 
environmental in nature or result from pollution of the environment.”22 
The court held that that was not the case here.23  
Some federal courts applying New York law appear to come out the 
same way. In Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance 
Co., the Second Circuit held that carbon monoxide released into an 
apartment building did not fall within the Exclusion.24 In Stoney Run, 
the policyholder owned buildings where tenants died or suffered bodily 
injury after inhaling carbon monoxide that was emitted into their 
apartments through the heating and ventilation system.25 The Second 
Circuit reviewed New York case law and concluded that the pollution 
exclusion clause was ambiguous.26 To resolve this ambiguity, the court 
focused on what it considered to be the general purpose of the 
exclusion—to exclude coverage for environmental pollution, but in a 
more restricted way than the plain language suggests.27 To that end, the 
Second Circuit held that “the release of carbon monoxide into an 
apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by 
the pollution exclusion clause.”28 
Several cases address the September 11th terrorist attack and hold 
that the Exclusion does not preclude coverage from the collapsed 
buildings that released noxious particulate matter into the air and 
settled in the policyholder’s buildings.29 Those decisions are also based 
on the Exclusion’s potential ambiguity in relation to contaminants 
released from destroyed buildings that collapsed in the terrorist attack. 
In Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s summary 
judgment ruling that the term “contamination” should be construed to 
exclude coverage in any situation, thus effectively determining that it 
21 Belt Painting, 795 N.E.2d at 16. 
22 Id. at 17 (internal quotations removed). 
23 Id. at 17. 
24 Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 39. 
27 Id. at 37. 
28 Id. at 38. 
29 Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
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is ambiguous.30 Based on the court’s understanding that 
“contamination . . . is an environmental term of art and applies only to 
discharges of pollutants into the environment,”31 the Second Circuit 
used a contextual definition of the Exclusion that it based on its own 
subjective perception of the parties’ intent.32 
Similarly, in Ocean Partners, L.L.C. v. North River Insurance Co., 
the policyholder sought coverage for damages to buildings from the 
September 11th attack, and the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York found the facts indistinguishable from 
Parks Real Estate.33 Accordingly, the court held that the term 
“contaminant” was ambiguous about when the Exclusion applied.34 
Obviously, the September 11th cases have a unique context that may 
not easily extend to other fact patterns.  
Note that the New York view that the Exclusion applies to pollutants 
discharged outdoors, as opposed to indoors, is not uniformly accepted 
across the country. States where the Exclusion applies more broadly 
than to pollutants discharged outdoors include Florida, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.35 Mississippi is undecided, but is 
leaning toward a broad reading of the Exclusion.36 Whether the 
Exclusion applies to pollutants discharged outdoors appears to be an 
30 Id. at 48–49. 
31 Id. at 44 (quoting Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 
526, 530 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
32 Id. at 48. 
33 Ocean Partners, L.L.C. v. N. River Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114–15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
34 Id. at 115. 
35 See, e.g., Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 
1135, 1138 (Fla. 1998); Atl. Ave. Assocs. v. Cent. Solutions, Inc., 24 P.3d 188, 191–92 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2001); McKusick v. Travelers Indem. Co., 632 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2001); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. German St. Vincent Orphan Assoc., Inc., 54 S.W.3d 661, 666 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Sokoloski v. Am. West Ins. Co., 980 P.2d 1043, 1044–45 (Mont. 
1999); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Neb. 2001); 
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cowen Constr., Inc., 55 P.3d 1030, 1034–35 (Okla. 2002); 
Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleyville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 109 (Pa. 1999); Zhiontz v. 
Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (odor eliminator); 
Peace ex. rel. Lerner v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 429, 442 (Wis. 1999). 
36 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying to paint 
and glue fumes and vapors; “[t]he pollution exclusion at issue encompasses more than 
traditional concepts of pollution.”). 
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area where the law will continue to evolve nationally. The law in New 
York could change with an evolving national consensus that the 
Exclusion should be enforced as written. 
B. Canada 
The leading Canadian case on the Exclusion is Zurich Insurance Co. 
v. 686234 Ontario Ltd., decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which
is the highest court in Canada’s most populous and most commercially 
important province.37 There, as in Stoney Run, the policyholder owned 
apartment buildings where carbon monoxide from a leaking furnace led 
to bodily injury claims.38 The litigants’ respective positions in the 
Canadian appeal paralleled those in the New York cases—the insurer 
argued that the Exclusion unambiguously excluded coverage, and the 
insured argued that the Exclusion was limited to pollution of the natural 
outdoor environment from industrial, commercial, or large-scale 
pollution (i.e., not indoor pollution from routine commercial hazards, 
such as a faulty heating system).39 
American jurisprudence informed much of the Zurich analysis 
because the Exclusion had previously been the subject of little judicial 
attention in Canada. The Ontario Court of Appeal was particularly 
swayed by Stoney Run (and a related line of cases), where the Second 
Circuit applied New York law, rather than by cases that interpreted the 
pollution exclusion more broadly.40 As in Stoney Run, the court 
concluded that the Exclusion was ambiguous and then considered what 
it regarded as the Exclusion’s inconclusive history as well as purpose 
to resolve that perceived ambiguity. The court did not focus on the 
text’s plain meaning.41 
37 Zurich Ins. Co. v. 686234 Ont. Ltd., 62 O.R. 3d 477 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2002). 
38 Id. ¶ 17. 
39 Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
40 Id. ¶ 36. The court considered and rejected another line of American cases interpreting 
the pollution exclusion more literally such that there would be no coverage for common 
business hazards such as carbon monoxide poisoning (which are not normally viewed as 
pollution). Id. 
41 Id. at 37. 
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III 
FOR THE EXCLUSION TO APPLY THERE MUST BE A NEXUS 
BETWEEN THE POLLUTANT AND THE DAMAGE 
A. New York 
A connection must exist between the pollution and the underlying 
injury for the Exclusion to apply. In Cedarhurst v. Hanover Insurance 
Co., the policyholder sought coverage for damages and injuries that 
arose from sewage overflow.42 Because the underlying complaint 
against the policyholder did not allege any pollution-related injuries, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that the Exclusion did not 
preclude coverage.43 Although the court held that the insurer must pay 
to defend the policyholder in the underlying litigation,44 the court did 
not rule on indemnification because if evidence of pollution-related 
injuries were to come to light then the Exclusion would preclude 
indemnification.45 While the court did not clearly rule on whether 
sewage was a pollutant for purposes of the Exclusion, it explained that 
the allegations of the underlying complaint informed the insurer’s duty 
to defend.46 The mere existence of pollutants, without pollution-related 
injuries, was not sufficient to implicate the Exclusion.47  
The sewage issue is currently being litigated around the country, 
even where a nexus between the sewage and the damage is present. For 
example, in Evanston Insurance Co. v. J&J Cable Construction, 
L.L.C., the insurer sought a declaratory judgment that the Exclusion 
precluded coverage for damages that arose from sewage that 
overflowed when a construction company struck a pipe.48 The damages 
included hospitalization for sewage exposure, water contamination, 
and seepage into homes.49 Nonetheless, the court found that while the 
damage was related to the pollutant nature of sewage, the Exclusion did 
42  Inc. Vill. of Cedarhurst v. Hanover Ins. Co., 675 N.E.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. 1996). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 825. 
45 Id. at 823. 
46 Id. at 824. 
47 Id. 
48 Evanston Ins. Co. v. J&J Cable Constr., L.L.C., No. 3:15cv-506-WHA, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129371, at 6–10 (M.D. Ala. 2016), aff’d, 719 Fed. App’x. 1002 (11th Cir. 
2018). 
49 Id. at 2. 
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not preclude coverage.50 The court reached this odd conclusion by 
relying on Alabama Supreme Court precedents.51  
B. Canada 
While no Canadian court has held that the Exclusion’s applicability 
depends on the link between the pollution and the underlying injury, 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal has arguably come close. In 
Precision Plating Ltd. v. AXA Pac. Insurance Co., the court held that 
the key question when considering the Exclusion’s applicability is the 
source of the alleged liability, not the source of the damage.52 The court 
went on to distinguish “the original or proximate cause of the damage” 
(fire) from “the source of the liability” (pollutant spill).53 If the spilled 
pollutant caused the liability, then the Exclusion applies—so long as 
what caused the liability is actually a pollutant.54 Precision Plating also 
acknowledged the proposition that a carrier’s defense obligations are 
broader than its indemnification obligations, which is also generally 
true in New York.55 While Precision Plating can be read as creating 
more predictability in the law with regard to the Exclusion, the 
distinction between the original cause of the damage and the source of 
the liability is arbitrary and metaphysical. Such apparent randomness 
in the law could well lead to more rather than less litigation. 
IV 
THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION APPLIES EVEN IF THE 
POLICYHOLDER IS BLAMELESS IN THE POLLUTION 
A. New York 
The Exclusion applies even if the policyholder is blameless in the 
pollution. In Budofsky v. Hartford Insurance Co., the court held that 
whether the policyholder accidentally or intentionally committed 
pollution was irrelevant to the Exclusion’s applicability, where the 
pollutants at issue were found to fall within the meaning of the 
Exclusion.56 There, lessees of the policyholders’ land had released 
industrial waste into dry wells and cesspools. While the policyholder 
50 Id. at 6–7. 
51 Id. at 6–7. 
52 Precision Plating Ltd. v. AXA Pacific Ins. Co., 2015 BCCA 277, ¶ 54. 
53 Id. ¶ 41. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
56 Budofsky v. Hartford Ins. Co., 556 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
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was clearly blameless for this conduct, what mattered more to the court 
was that the industrial waste was a form of environmental pollution.57 
Although the policyholder neither intended to nor caused the pollution, 
the court held that the Exclusion applied.58 
The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed this holding in Town of 
Harrison v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.59 In Town of Harrison, 
policyholders sought coverage for liability that arose from the 
policyholders’ excavation contractor dumping noxious waste on 
neighboring land.60 Like the Budofsky court, the Court of Appeals held 
that so long as the released matter was a pollutant, the Exclusion 
unambiguously precluded coverage, even where the policyholder was 
blameless in causing the actual pollution.61 
B. Canada 
A similar development in the law occurred north of the border. In 
ING Insurance Co. of Canada v. Miracle, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
held that whether the policyholder is “active” or “passive” in causing 
the pollution is irrelevant, because the Exclusion applies when the 
insured does something that is known to have pollution risk.62 This 
reasoning is akin to the Town of Harrison and Budofsky line of cases, 
which held that the Exclusion precludes coverage even in situations 
where the policyholder is blameless—or at least not active—in causing 
the pollution.63 
In Miracle, the insured operated a gas station where underground 
storage tanks leaked toxins onto adjacent property.64 The Miracle court 
focused on the fact that the insured did something that carried an 
obvious risk of pollution and that the claim alleged damage to the 
natural environment by a well-recognized form of pollution.65 That the 
insured was passive or blameless was irrelevant in determining whether 
the Exclusion applied.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Town of Harrison v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 675 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1996). 
60 Id. at 830–31. 
61 Id. at 832. 
62 ING Ins. Co. v. Miracle, 2011 ONCA 321, ¶ 23. 
63 See Town of Harrison, 675 N.E.2d at 832; Budofsky v. Hartford Ins. Co., 556 
N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
64 Miracle, ¶ 1. 
65 Id. ¶ 22. 
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V 
EMERGING NEW YORK LAW SUGGESTS THAT NONTRADITIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION MAY FALL WITHIN THE 
EXCLUSION FOR FIRST-PARTY COVERAGE 
New York law suggests that various forms of nontraditional 
environmental pollution may fall within the Exclusion for first-party 
insurance coverage. In Broome County v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the 
policyholder purchased a first-party property policy that excluded 
“discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape” of 
pollutants.66 An intermediate New York appellate court held that the 
Exclusion applied to short, migratory events that damaged the 
policyholder’s property, which in that case was silica dust migrating 
through an elevator shaft.67 The appellate court reasoned that to hold 
otherwise would render the Exclusion meaningless.68 The court 
distinguished first-party from third-party insurance (for which the 
Court of Appeals had limited the Exclusion to what it considered 
environmental pollution).69 The Broome County court held that the only 
reasonable reading that would give meaning to the Exclusion in first-
party property insurance was to preclude coverage.70 Similar results as 
in Broome County could be expected in other cases, given the New 
York rule of interpretation that contractual terms—including insurance 
policies—are not to be read in such a way that renders other terms 
meaningless.71  
Rather than drawing a distinction between first-party and third-party 
insurance, in Palliser Regional Division No. 26 v. Aviva Scottish, an 
Alberta trial court drew a line between the insured’s business and 
nonbusiness activities.72 There, a group of residents alleged that coal 
dust from a neighboring insured school’s property had blown onto the 
residents’ land and caused damage.73 The court held that coal-dust 
66 Broome Cty v. Travelers Indem. Co., 145 A.D.3d 1241, 1241–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2015). 
67 Id. at 1242–43. 
68 Id. at 1242. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. The court also noted that the insurance contract defined pollutants to include 
building materials and that a faulty workmanship clause independently and alternatively 
precluded coverage. Id.  
71 See, e.g., Cty. of Columbia v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 634 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1994). 
72 Palliser Reg’l Div. No. 26 v. Aviva Scottish & York Ins. Co., 2004 ABQB 781, at 
para. 25, 39, 40. 
73 Id. at para. 1, 3. 
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pollution damage was not excluded because it did not flow from the 
insured’s main business activity.74 The court determined that coal dust 
was a pollutant but concluded that the Exclusion did not apply because 
the school’s industrial or business activity had nothing to do with 
releasing the coal dust.75 Presumably, if the coal dust had blown off a 
coal-powered electricity-generating plant, then under the same policy 
the Exclusion would apply. Under those circumstances, the result 
would be similar to Broome County: no coverage under the pollution 
exclusion for losses off the insured’s property. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal has supported the idea that the Exclusion should be applied to 
the industrial or business activities of the insured, but has not explicitly 
stated that the Exclusion is limited to such activities.76 How the 
distinction between insured’s business and nonbusiness activities plays 
out in the appellate courts when they squarely address the issue remains 
to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
The Exclusion is written broadly to expressly exclude coverage for 
pollution-related liability. Nevertheless, some courts in New York and 
Canada have struggled to insert absent phrases such as “environmental” 
or “outdoor” as qualifiers to limit the type of pollution that the 
Exclusion captures. In trying to extend coverage to what some judges 
regard as sympathetic policyholders, these result-oriented decisions 
typically cite vague notions of parties’ expectations. But the best guide 
to the parties’ bargain is the actual policy language. Courts that focus 
on sympathies and ill-defined extrinsic evidence (that is often not even 
mentioned in the opinion) create an unwieldy legal system where 
parties’ expectations can be upended depending on the length of the 
chancellor’s proverbial foot. Courts should focus on the parties’ 
expectations and enforce the policies’ terms, including any exclusions, 
as written because that gives effect to the parties’ expectations and 
bargains. Indeed, the most recent trend is to enforce plain policy 
language as written even where the policyholder is blameless in 
causing the pollution. 
74 Id. at para. 25, 39, 40. 
75 Id. 
76 ING Ins. Co. of Canada v. Miracle, 2011 ONCA 321, at para. 19–22. 
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